Feminism and the Nature of the Self: Individualism vs. Relational Identity
For centuries, philosophers have been obsessed with the question of the self: Who are we? What makes us, us? How do we know that we exist, and how do we define our identity? These are questions that have preoccupied thinkers throughout history. Classical philosophers such as René Descartes and John Locke developed models of the self that positioned the individual as an independent, autonomous entity. Descartes’ famous assertion, “Cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am), suggested that the self is primarily a thinking subject, isolated from the outside world. Locke, on the other hand, argued that the self was a continuity of memories and experiences, built from our ability to reflect on our past.
For a long time, this understanding of the self dominated Western thought: we were all supposed to be independent individuals, free to shape our own identities through rational thought and memory. However, feminist philosophers, among others, began to challenge this individualistic and abstract conception of the self, arguing that identity is not simply the product of internal thought or memory. Rather, it is shaped by external influences — by relationships, societal norms, and power structures. For them, identity is not about standing alone as some rational agent but rather a fluid, social construct.
Source: From the series, A Woman By Any Other Name © Jess Cochrane
The Traditional View of the Self: Solo, Independent, and Outdated
Before we jump into the feminist critique, it’s important to understand the traditional, individualistic view of the self. The most prominent thinkers in the development of the modern notion of the self were Descartes and Locke. Descartes, through his work in Meditations on First Philosophy, famously argued that the only thing we can be certain of is that we exist as thinking beings. According to Descartes, the self is primarily a mind — a rational subject who thinks, doubts, and reasons independently of the body or the outside world. His declaration “Cogito, ergo sum” highlights the self as an isolated, independent thinker, separated from the material world. Descartes thought that our ability to think was what made us who we are. No need for anyone else — it’s all about the inner workings of our mind.
Likewise, Locke believed that we are who we are because of our ability to reflect on our past experiences, forming a continuous narrative. That’s nice and all, but it doesn’t exactly account for how our identity is shaped by others — by our families, friends, communities, and social structures. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke presented a somewhat different view. For Locke, the self was a continuous identity built from memory and experience. He argued that personal identity is rooted in the capacity to reflect on one’s past experiences. A person is the same individual over time as long as they retain a continuity of memories, regardless of any physical changes. In this view, the self is not defined by any material substance or external factor but by the continuity of mental states.
While these theories of the self were revolutionary in their time, they were also very limited. Descartes’ model of the self is criticized for being overly abstract and disconnected from the real world, while Locke’s view of identity as a memory-based narrative does not account for the many ways in which our identities are shaped by external, relational factors. This is especially problematic for understanding identity in a world where relationships, social norms, and power structures play a significant role in shaping who we are.
Here’s the kicker: this individualistic idea of the self was developed largely from the perspective of white, cisgender men living in the West. The idea that we are completely separate and defined by our inner thoughts doesn’t exactly reflect how most people experience the world, especially women and marginalized groups, who have historically been defined by their relationships with others. So, what happens when you step outside the ivory tower of individualism and take a more nuanced view? Well, that’s where feminist philosophers come in.
Feminist Critiques of the Traditional Model of the Self
Feminist philosophy has long challenged the individualistic conception of the self. Feminist thinkers, such as Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler, and Carol Gilligan, have argued that identity is not something that exists independently of others or outside of social contexts. In their view, the self is always relational, shaped by interactions with others, and subject to the norms and structures of society.
One of the most influential critics of the traditional model of the self comes from Simone de Beauvoir. In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir famously wrote, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.” This statement is a critique of the traditional view of identity that suggests that a person is born with an inherent essence or identity. Instead, de Beauvoir argued that gender identity is something that is socially constructed through the experiences and expectations of society. She emphasized that women’s identities are shaped by their relationships with men, family members, and society at large. Women are not simply born with an inherent essence of “womanhood,” but rather, they are defined by the roles and expectations that society places on them. In this way, de Beauvoir’s feminist existentialism challenges the traditional, individualistic view of the self by arguing that identity is constructed through relationships and social forces. This view challenges the notion that identity is something pre-existing, something we just “discover” on our own. Instead, it’s something that emerges in relation to the world around us.
Judith Butler, another major feminist philosopher, takes a different approach in critiquing the traditional view of the self. In Gender Trouble, Butler introduced the idea that gender is not an inherent, biological trait, but rather something that is performed. For Butler, gender identity is not something that a person “is,” but something that a person “does.” She argues that gender is constructed through repeated performances, behaviors, and actions that reflect societal norms and expectations. Gender is not a fixed, stable characteristic but something that is fluid and subject to change. It's kind of like trying to bake a cake where the ingredients are constantly changing. So much for the solid, stable, self-sufficient individual, right? In this framework, identity itself becomes relational and context-dependent. Rather than being defined by a set of essential characteristics, identity becomes something that is shaped by ongoing interactions with the world and the people around us.
Carol Gilligan’s work on moral development also provides important insights into the relational nature of identity. In In a Different Voice, Gilligan critiques traditional moral theories that focus on autonomy, independence, and rational decision-making. She argues that these theories, which are based largely on male-dominated models of moral reasoning, fail to account for the ways in which women’s moral identities are shaped by their relationships with others. For Gilligan, morality is not simply about individual rights or rational thought; it is rooted in care, empathy, and the relationships we have with others. She suggests that women’s moral reasoning is often grounded in the responsibility to care for others and to nurture relationships. This approach to moral identity reflects a relational self that is concerned with interconnectedness and care rather than autonomy and independence.
In these feminist critiques, the traditional view of the self as an independent, rational agent is replaced with a more relational view of identity, one that acknowledges the importance of our connections to others, our communities, and the social structures in which we live.
The Relational Self: Identity as a Product of Relationships, It’s Not Just About You, It’s About Us
Source: From the series, A Woman By Any Other Name © Jess Cochrane
The feminist view of the self emphasises the idea that identity is shaped by relationships and social context. This relational self is not defined in isolation but is always connected to others. As Judith Butler points out, identity is something that we perform through our actions and interactions with others. It is not something that exists independently of the world around us, but rather is continually shaped by the social norms and expectations that influence our behaviour.
Nancy Chodorow, a feminist psychoanalyst, explores this relational self in the context of gender and caregiving. In her work, Chodorow examines how early experiences, particularly those with primary caregivers, shape our understanding of selfhood. She argues that gender identity is formed through the caregiving relationships we have as children, particularly the relationship between mothers and children. For Chodorow, the emotional bonds formed in these early relationships shape how we perceive ourselves and our roles in society. Women, in particular, are socialised to see themselves as caretakers and nurturers, while men are socialised to value independence and autonomy. These relational dynamics influence how we construct our identities and how we understand our place in the world.
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice picks up on this theme and challenges the traditional moral frameworks that prioritise autonomy and individual rights. Instead of seeing morality as a question of rational, independent decision-making (as traditional philosophy often does), Gilligan argues that care and relationships are at the heart of ethical decisions. Her “ethics of care” suggests that moral reasoning is often rooted in empathy, understanding, and the willingness to nurture others—all of which require an interdependent, relational approach to the self.
For feminist philosophers, the relational self also offers new ways of thinking about autonomy. Rather than being about solitary independence, autonomy can be understood as the ability to navigate and negotiate one’s relationships in ways that respect both one’s own desires and the needs of others. Autonomy, from a feminist perspective, is not about standing alone as an isolated individual but about understanding and defining oneself within a network of relationships and social connections. This broader understanding of autonomy allows for a more nuanced approach to individual freedom that recognises the importance of interdependence.
Why This Matters: Shifting the Focus from Independence to Interdependence
Feminist theories of the self are important because they shift the focus from individualism to interdependence. They ask us to think about identity not as something fixed and self-contained but as something dynamic, shaped by the people and relationships around us. The idea of the self as relational opens up the conversation about how we can understand and promote autonomy in a way that takes social realities into account. Autonomy, in this view, isn’t about being a lone wolf; it’s about having the ability to define your identity and navigate your relationships in a way that respects both your independence and your interdependence.
This approach has profound implications for social justice. When we understand that identity is relational, we can begin to address how systems of power — such as sexism, racism, and classism — shape people’s experiences of the self. We can better understand how marginalised people’s identities are often defined by oppressive social structures, and we can work to dismantle those systems to allow for more freedom and agency. For example, the #MeToo movement has highlighted how gendered identities are shaped by patriarchal power structures, while the experiences of Black women in the United States demonstrate how race and gender intersect to create complex, layered experiences of oppression.
Furthermore, the relational self highlights the importance of care and empathy in creating a just society. As Carol Gilligan suggests, moral reasoning should be rooted in relationships of care and responsibility. Rather than focusing solely on individual rights or abstract principles of justice, we should consider how our actions affect the lives of others and how we can build a society that nurtures and supports everyone. This relational approach to justice calls for a more compassionate and inclusive vision of society, one that recognises the interconnectedness of all people and the importance of caring for others.
Source: From the series, A Woman By Any Other Name © Jess Cochrane
A Shift Toward Interconnectedness
In conclusion, the feminist critique of the self offers a compelling alternative to the traditional, individualistic view of identity. Rather than seeing the self as an isolated, autonomous agent, feminist philosophers propose a more relational understanding of identity — one that acknowledges the importance of relationships, social structures, and interdependence. This relational self allows for a deeper understanding of autonomy, social justice, and the ways in which power shapes our identities. By embracing the relational nature of the self, we can move toward a more inclusive, compassionate, and just society.
In a world where our lives are increasingly defined by our connections to others, the idea of the self as an isolated, independent individual seems outdated. The relational self recognises that we are not solitary beings, but creatures deeply embedded in networks of relationships and social contexts. This understanding of identity offers new possibilities for how we live, how we care for each other, and how we create a more just world for everyone. So, while Descartes may have been on to something with his “I think, therefore I am,” feminist philosophers would add a few words to that — “I relate, therefore I am.”
S xoxo
Written in New York City, New York
6th January 2025